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ABSTRACT 
Self-replicating technologies pose a challenge to the legal regimes we 
ordinarily rely on to promote a balance between innovation and competition. 
This Article examines recent efforts by the federal courts to deal with the leading 
edge of this policy challenge in cases involving the quintessential self-replicating 
technology: the seed. In a recent series of cases involving the invocation of the 
patent exhaustion defense by purchasers of Monsanto’s “Roundup-Ready” 
genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crop technologies, farmers have 
argued that Monsanto’s patent rights do not extend to the second generation of 
soybeans grown from a patented first-generation seed. In each case, the Federal 
Circuit found for Monsanto and against the farmers. The Supreme Court is about 
to take up the issue for the first time.  
In this Article, I argue that the Federal Circuit reached the right result in the 
Roundup-Ready cases, but that it failed to articulate a satisfactory justification 
for its decisions. That justification, I claim, should be that the patent-based policy 
set by the Federal Circuit is preferable to alternative legal regimes—such as 
trade secret and contract law—because it avoids disincentives to competition, 
innovation, and dissemination of new self-replicating technologies while 
reducing transaction costs inherent in their commercialization. Importantly, 
however, not all self-replicating technologies are identical, and a categorical rule 
exempting them from patent exhaustion doctrine is unwarranted. I propose 
instead that application of the exhaustion doctrine should depend on the 
patentee’s ability to charge supracompetitive prices in its primary market where 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most can raise the flowers now, 
For all have got the seed.
1
 
Self-replicating technologies, once the subject of theory2 and fantasy,3 are 
now upon us. The original self-replicating machine—the living organism—has 
already been harnessed by biotechnology engineers and, more to the point, their 
patent lawyers.4 The next wave of self-replicating technologies, be they 
nanorobots or organic computers, are not far behind.5 Rather than triggering a 
“gray goo” apocalypse,6 these technologies are, at present, raising far more 
prosaic issues of intellectual property and antitrust law. In particular, they are 
challenging businesses, lawyers, and judges to establish a policy framework 
that will appropriately balance innovation with competition, allowing self-
 
 1.  Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Flower, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED LORD TENNYSON 
POET LAUREATE 230 (New York, The MacMillan Company 1901) (1884). 
 2.  See generally, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN, THEORY OF SELF-REPRODUCING 
AUTOMATA (Arthur W. Burks ed., 1966). 
 3.  See generally, e.g., *BATTERIES NOT INCLUDED (Universal Pictures 1987). 
 4.  See generally, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (engineered 
bacteria); Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (transgenic mouse). 
 5.  See generally Tong Wang et al., Self-Replication of Information-Bearing 
Nanoscale Patterns, 478 NATURE 225 (2011), available at http://www.nature.com/ 
nature/journal/v478 /n7368/full/nature10500.html; Robert A. Freitas, Jr., Current Status of 
Nanomedicine and Medical Nanorobotics, 2 J. OF COMPUTATIONAL & THEORETICAL 
NANOSCIENCE 1 (2005). 
 6.  K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION 2.0: THE COMING ERA OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 354-55 (20th Anniversary ed. 2006) (“[A]ssembler-based replicators will 
therefore be able to do all that life can, and more. From an evolutionary point of view, this 
poses an obvious threat . . . . [E]arly assembler-based replicators could beat the most 
advanced modern organisms. ‘Plants’ with ‘leaves’ no more efficient than today’s solar cells 
could out-compete real plants, crowding the biosphere with an inedible foliage. Tough, 
omnivorous ‘bacteria’ could out-compete real bacteria: they could spread like blowing 
pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to dust in a matter of days. Dangerous 
replicators could easily be too tough, small, and rapidly spreading to stop—at least if we 
made no preparation . . . . Among the cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become 
known as the ‘gray goo problem.’”). 
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replicating technologies to be efficiently developed and commercialized for the 
benefit of society. 
This Article examines recent efforts by the federal courts to deal with the 
leading edge of this policy challenge in cases involving the quintessential self-
replicating technology: the seed. In a recent series of cases involving 
Monsanto’s “Roundup-Ready” genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crop 
technologies, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been 
steadily charting the boundary between patent and antitrust principles as 
applied to self-replicating technologies. In each of the Roundup-Ready cases, a 
farmer has argued that Monsanto’s patent rights do not extend to the second 
generation of soybeans grown from a patented first-generation seed. In each 
case, the Federal Circuit found for Monsanto and against the farmer.7 In its 
October 2012 Term, the Supreme Court of the United States will take up the 
issue for the first time.8 
The Roundup-Ready cases are a harbinger of things to come. A number of 
similar herbicide-resistant crops are in the pipeline of the largest agribusiness 
concerns,9 and other self-replicating technologies lie just over the horizon.10 
Moreover, these cases offer a useful lens on the economic issues presented by 
self-replicating technologies in general and the efforts to incentivize their 
creation and commercialization through law. While Monsanto’s genetically 
engineered crop technologies present a host of complex policy issues,11 in this 
Article, I will address only the specific issue of patent exhaustion addressed by 
the Federal Circuit’s decided cases. Specifically, I will argue that the Federal 
Circuit reached the right result in the Roundup-Ready cases, but that it failed to 
articulate a satisfactory justification for its decisions. That justification, I claim, 
should be that the patent-based policy set by the Federal Circuit is preferable to 
alternative legal regimes—such as trade secret and contract law—because it 
avoids disincentives to competition, innovation, and dissemination of new self-
replicating technologies while reducing transaction costs inherent in their 
 
 7.  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling II), 363 F.3d 1336, 1343-44 
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling I), 302 F.3d 1291, 1296-99 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 8.  Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. 
Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx? 
FileName=/docketfiles/11-796.htm. 
 9.  Andrew Pollack, A Battle Over an Engineered Crop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at 
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/business/energy-environment/dow-
weed-killer-runs-into-opposition.html. 
 10.  See sources cited supra notes 5-6. 
 11.  Many other issues, such as how to prevent or deal with the escape of engineered 
genetic material into non-engineered crop populations, monopolization of the seed market 
itself, potential restrictions of follow-on innovations, and the related problem of 
evergreening, are explored in Daryl Lim, Rebooting the Bean, ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law, Agriculture and Food Committee Bulletin (Fall 2012), at 2, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163220. 
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commercialization. Importantly, however, this policy analysis also requires us 
to recognize that not all self-replicating technologies are identical, and thus that 
a categorical rule exempting them from patent exhaustion doctrine is 
unwarranted. I propose instead that application of the exhaustion doctrine 
should depend on analysis of the relationship between demand for first-
generation embodiments of a self-replicating technology and demand for 
subsequent-generation embodiments, and particularly the patentee’s ability to 
charge supracompetitive prices in its primary market where consumers are able 
to substitute secondary-market embodiments. This understanding of the stakes 
of patent exhaustion doctrine illuminates not only its application to self-
replicating technologies, but its application to patented technologies in general. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides relevant background on 
the law of patent exhaustion and its complicated relationship to both innovation 
and competition policy. Part II describes the case study of self-replicating 
technology provided by Monsanto’s technology and the judicial decisions 
adjudicating its intellectual property rights with respect to that technology. Part 
III critiques the Federal Circuit’s explanation that its rulings were designed to 
prevent “eviscerat[ion]” of patents in self-replicating technology by exploring 
two alternative policy regimes under which such technologies might be 
commercialized—trade secret and contract regimes—and discussing the likely 
effects for innovation and competition of channeling inventors of self-
replicating technologies into such alternative regimes. Finding these alternative 
regimes unsatisfactory, Part IV goes on to examine the features of self-
replicating technologies that are likely to channel innovators out of the patent 
regime and into those unsatisfactory alternatives—principally the ability to 
substitute a subsequent-generation embodiment for a first-generation 
embodiment—and generalizes from this analysis to draw lessons about the 
appropriate scope of patent exhaustion doctrine in general. I ultimately argue 
that the applicability of the exhaustion defense ought to depend on judgments 
about the appropriate balance between maintaining the incentive to innovation 
afforded by the ability to charge a monopoly price for a patented technology 
and ensuring access to such technologies for those who are unable to pay that 
monopoly price. Inevitably, such judgments will entail fact-specific sensitivity 
to both the nature of individual patented technologies and to the structure of 
demand for them. 
I. PATENT EXHAUSTION: THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
A patent gives its holder the “right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
importing the invention into the United States.”12 But there are limits to the 
patentee’s ability to enforce this exclusionary right, some grounded in concerns 
over competition policy. For example, the patent misuse doctrine “forbids the 
 
 12.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
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use of [a] patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted 
by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.”13 Most 
commonly, this doctrine has been invoked to condemn particular tying 
arrangements and as such has been modified by statute to align it (in part) with 
prevailing principles of antitrust law.14 The doctrine of patent exhaustion, or 
first sale doctrine,15 “provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item 
terminates all patent rights to that item.”16 It, too, has been identified with 
competition policy, although current Supreme Court jurisprudence leaves the fit 
between exhaustion and relevant antitrust doctrines open to question.17 Finally, 
antitrust law in general remains applicable to the practices of those who trade in 
patented technology—particularly as applied to licensing agreements, which 
are governed not only by patent law but by contract law.18 
Patent law’s first sale doctrine is currently in an uncertain state, with the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court (to say nothing of those courts’ 
observers) disagreeing on its scope. Within Supreme Court jurisprudence, there 
is a distinction between the right to use and the right to make a patented 
invention. While the patentee relinquishes the right to control the use of a 
patented article upon selling it, such a sale does not authorize the purchaser to 
make a newly infringing article—a principle that has historically arisen when 
the purchaser (or another downstream actor) repairs or refurbishes the article.19 
Moreover, to trigger patent exhaustion a sale of a patented article must be 
“authorized,” a requirement that some patentees have successfully contracted 
 
 13.  Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). 
 14.  35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010); see generally Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of 
Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003) (arguing that the 
innovation policies underlying patent misuse are not entirely coextensive with antitrust 
policy, and particularly not with rule of reason analysis given the prerequisite of market 
power for a finding of liability). For an overview of the history and policy of patent misuse 
doctrine, see generally Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475 
(2010). 
 15.  This Article will use the terms “patent exhaustion” and “first sale” 
interchangeably. 
 16.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); see also 
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) (“[W]hen the patentee, or the person 
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the 
consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.”); Bloomer v. 
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“And when the machine passes to the 
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.”). 
 17.  See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: 
The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487 (2011). Similar 
doctrines apply in copyright and trademark law. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008) (codifying the 
copyright first sale doctrine); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924) (establishing 
the trademark first sale doctrine). 
 18.  See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST (2d ed. 2010). 
 19.  Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-46 & 
n.9 (1961); cf. Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (finding refurbishment 
of used and severed patented cotton bale ties marked with a “use once only” restriction to be 
an infringement, without discussing the first sale issue). 
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around using license restrictions. Thus, where a patentee licenses a 
manufacturer to produce articles under its patent but limits that license’s scope, 
the manufacturer’s sale of an embodiment of the patent outside of that scope is 
“unauthorized.” Such sales will not exhaust the patentee’s rights as to those 
articles, at least where the purchaser was on notice of the breach of the 
license.20 
Over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has taken this restricted 
license exception to the first sale doctrine one step further, extending it to end 
users of patented inventions. The mechanism for this extension is the 
“conditional sale” doctrine, under which post-sale restrictions imposed on a 
patented article under a contract with the end user of the article (as opposed to a 
licensed manufacturer or other intermediary) can prevent exhaustion of the 
patentee’s rights with respect to that article. So, for example, in Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., where a patentee transferred possession of a patented 
medical device to a hospital pursuant to a label license providing that the 
device was for “single use only,” the court held that reuse of the device 
constituted not just a violation of the license terms (i.e., breach of contract), but 
also could potentially constitute patent infringement.21 The Federal Circuit 
relied on numerous patent misuse cases to conclude that “not all restrictions on 
the [post-sale] use of patented goods are unenforceable”22 and reasoned that 
such restrictions could likewise be used to limit the first sale doctrine. In so 
doing, the Federal Circuit seemed to be attempting to align the first sale 
doctrine with rule-of-reason analysis under antitrust law, following a similar 
effort with respect to patent misuse doctrine.23 
Recently, the Supreme Court has pushed back on the Federal Circuit’s 
“conditional sale” doctrine and the resulting pressure on the first sale doctrine. 
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court clothed 
its reversal of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in broad language that appeared 
inconsistent with the conditional sale doctrine of Mallinckrodt.25 However, the 
holding in Quanta was grounded in the particular facts of the license 
agreements at issue in that case, which the Supreme Court interpreted to create 
unconditional sales.26 The result was, in some commentators’ view, a missed 
 
 20.  Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938), aff’d on 
reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 21.  Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (1992). 
 22.  Id. at 703-06. 
 23.  Id. at 706; cf. sources cited supra note 14. 
 24.  553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 25.  Id. at 638 (“The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent 
exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law 
to control postsale use of the article.”); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 501 & nn.60, 
64; Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F.Supp.2d 575, 585-86 (E.D. 
Ky. 2009) (“Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio. The Supreme Court’s broad 
statement of the law of patent exhaustion simply cannot be squared with the position that the 
Quanta holding is limited to its specific facts.”). 
 26.  Quanta, 553 U.S. at 635-37. 
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opportunity: an apparent but indirect rejection of the Federal Circuit’s rule-of-
reason approach without any guidance as to the appropriate relationship 
between first sale doctrine and competition (or innovation) policy.27 
There are thus at least two important distinctions on which current patent 
exhaustion doctrine turns: between “using” and “making” an invention, on the 
one hand, and between conditional licenses and conditional sales, on the other. 
The use/make distinction can be derived entirely from Supreme Court 
precedent, while the license/sale distinction represents a possible divergence 
between Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. Each of these 
distinctions turns out to be highly formalistic in practice and can destabilize as 
market actors innovate not only their technologies, but also their business 
strategies for exploiting and commercializing those technologies. Self-
replicating technologies in general, and the Roundup-Ready cases in particular, 
highlight this doctrinal instability, as the next Part demonstrates. 
II. ROUNDUP-READY ROUNDUP 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Approach 
Monsanto is a manufacturer and former patentee28 of a potent herbicide—
glyphosate—that it markets under the brand name “Roundup.”29 Glyphosate 
operates by inhibiting the operation of an enzyme essential to the production of 
amino acids in plants.30 Monsanto has also engineered a variant gene that can 
produce a glyphosate-tolerant version of the inhibited enzyme and has obtained 
patent protection for the modified gene, plants and plant cells that incorporate 
the modified gene, and related genetic engineering technologies necessary to 
the production of plants and seeds composed of those cells.31 Monsanto 
markets seeds for glyphosate-tolerant crops under the “Roundup-Ready” brand 
name.32 
Roundup-Ready seeds are produced either by Monsanto itself or by 
independent seed manufacturers operating under license from Monsanto. Under 
such a license, seed manufacturers obtain the right to insert the chimeric 
Roundup-Ready gene into the germplasm of their own seeds (allowing their 
seeds to express the glyphosate-resistant trait), subject to two conditions. First, 
they must pay Monsanto a royalty for every bag of seed they sell. Second, 
 
 27.  Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 491. 
 28.  U.S. Patent Nos. 3,977,860 (filed June 11, 1973), 3,799,758 (filed Aug. 9, 1971). 
 29.  Monsanto, THE HISTORY OF ROUNDUP (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) 
http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement/pages/history-roundup-ready.aspx. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  U.S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993), 5,633,435 (filed Sept. 13, 1994). 
A description of the development of these technologies into commercial-scale seed 
production can be found in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586-88 & nn.1-2 
(N.D. Miss. 2004). 
 32.  Monsanto, supra note 29. 
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every such sale of seed must be made pursuant to a “Technology Agreement” 
with the purchaser, rather than as an unconditional sale of the chattels 
themselves. In other words, every farmer who wants to buy Roundup-Ready 
soybean seed must take a restricted license to Monsanto’s patents, and must 
pay a price that includes pass-through of Monsanto’s royalty.33 
The Technology Agreement purports to impose several restrictions on 
farmers who purchase Roundup-Ready seed. First, farmers must agree to use 
the purchased seed to grow a commercial crop in a single season only. Second, 
they must agree not to provide the purchased seed to anyone else for planting. 
Third, they must agree not to use the seed for breeding, research, or similar 
purposes, nor to allow anyone else to do so. And finally (and most importantly 
for present purposes), they must agree not to save any of the crop grown from 
the purchased seeds to be replanted, either by the farmer-licensee or by anyone 
else.34 
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the defendant farmer acceded to the 
Technology Agreement and then intentionally violated its terms by saving and 
replanting crops grown from the licensed seed for two successive seasons.35 
Monsanto sued him for patent infringement and breach of contract, and 
prevailed in district court, first obtaining a preliminary injunction36 and 
ultimately winning summary judgment on the central questions of liability.37 In 
both instances Monsanto overcame McFarling’s assertion of patent misuse and 
first sale defenses. In finding for Monsanto, the Federal Circuit did obliquely 
refer to its “conditional sale” exception to the first sale doctrine,38 but did not 
resolve the first sale defense on that basis. Rather, it reasoned that “[t]he 
original sale of the [first-generation] seeds did not confer a license to construct 
new seeds, and since the new seeds were not sold by the patentee they entailed 
no principle of patent exhaustion.”39 The Federal Circuit thus drew on the 
Supreme Court’s distinction, noted above,40 between using a patented article 
and making a new article. 
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the farmer claimed to have acquired 
Roundup-Ready seed from one of Monsanto’s licensed seed manufacturers in 
 
 33.  McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1339; Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-
45 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796); Scruggs, 
459 F.3d at 1333. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1339. 
 36.  See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling I), 302 F.3d 1291, 1296-99 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (affirming preliminary injunction). 
 37.  Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 2002 WL 32069634, at *3-5 (Nov. 5, 2002). 
 38.  McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1299 (quoting B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 
124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997), a conditional sale case). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-46 & 
n.9 (1961); cf. Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (finding refurbishment 
of used and severed patented cotton bale ties marked with a “use once only” restriction to be 
an infringement, without discussing the first sale issue). 
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an unrestricted sale—i.e., without agreeing to Monsanto’s Technology 
Agreement, in violation of Monsanto’s license to the seed manufacturer itself.41 
The Federal Circuit again rejected an asserted first sale defense, on two 
grounds. The first was identical to the holding in McFarling: that the second-
generation seeds had been made by Scruggs rather than sold to him.42 The 
second relied on the conditional license exception to patent exhaustion: Scruggs 
had never in fact purchased Monsanto’s patented goods in an “authorized” sale, 
since Monsanto did not authorize its licensed seed manufacturers to make 
unrestricted sales of seeds containing its patented technology and Scruggs was 
on notice of that restriction.43 Having invoked both the use/make distinction 
and the Supreme Court’s conditional license rule, the Federal Circuit went on 
to announce a sweeping new principle: “Applying the first sale doctrine to 
subsequent generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the 
rights of the patent holder.”44 
In Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, an Indiana farmer seemed to have found a 
clever way around Monsanto’s license terms. Rather than saving seed from his 
first-generation crop, he sold that crop into the commodity market, then later 
went to a “grain elevator”—a wholesaler in the commodity grain and oilseed 
market—and purchased commodity soybeans to be used as seed for a second 
crop.45 Because approximately 94% of Indiana’s soybean acreage is planted 
with herbicide-resistant seed, many of these commodity soybeans expressed the 
Roundup-Ready trait, meaning Bowman was able to clean and plant the 
purchased commodity soybeans and treat them with glyphosate.46 Bowman 
then saved the seed grown from that second crop for replanting.47 Because 
Monsanto’s Technology Agreement expressly permits farmers to sell second-
generation soybeans to grain elevators as a commodity, Bowman argued that 
Monsanto’s patents were exhausted as to the commodity seeds he purchased 
from the local grain elevator, leaving him free to use them as he saw fit.48 
As ingenious as Bowman’s workaround of the Monsanto Technology 
Agreement may seem, it did not amuse the Federal Circuit. That court once 
again invoked the use/make distinction, holding that even if Monsanto’s rights 
in the commodity seeds were exhausted, once Bowman planted those seeds and 
raised the resulting plants he had made an unauthorized newly infringing article 
as to which Monsanto retained its patent rights.49 Again, the court held, 
 
 41.  Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 42.  Id. at 1336. 
 43.  Id.; cf. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938), 
aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 44.  Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336. 
 45.  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1346. 
 49.  Id. at 1348. 
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applying first sale doctrine to self-replicating technologies would “eviscerate” 
the patents for such technologies.50 
B. Tensions With (and Within) Supreme Court Precedent 
In the Roundup-Ready cases, and particularly in Bowman, the Federal 
Circuit relied heavily on the use/make distinction to find end users of 
Monsanto’s self-replicating technology to be bound by the restrictions in their 
license agreements not only as a matter of contract law but as a matter of patent 
law. Indeed, this would seem to be the only way Bowman’s activities could 
result in legal liability, as he complied with the express terms of his 
Technology Agreement. But of course, the application of the use/make 
distinction in the Roundup-Ready cases ignores the elephant in the room: the 
only and intended “use” of seeds or any other self-replicating technology 
necessarily “makes” a newly infringing article—this is the defining 
characteristic of self-replicating technologies. Indeed, Monsanto’s Technology 
Agreement explicitly permits end-user farmers to plant, grow (i.e., make), 
harvest, and sell articles reading on Monsanto’s patents. What that agreement 
purports to restrict is the farmer-licensees’ commercial uses of those patented 
articles, the making of which is explicitly authorized. Thus self-replicating 
technologies, by their nature, destabilize the use/make distinction and render it 
an inadequate tool for defining the scope and limits of patent rights. 
For the same reason, the other distinction in patent exhaustion doctrine—
between conditional licenses and conditional sales—breaks down when applied 
to self-replicating technologies. Viewed in one light, Monsanto’s Technology 
Agreement can be analogized to the field-of-use restrictions in the 
manufacturer’s license in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric 
Co.51—it places restrictions on the markets into which farmers in their capacity 
as soybean manufacturers can sell the finished products for which Monsanto’s 
patented technology is an input. But of course, the Technology Agreement can 
just as easily be analogized to the label license in Mallinckrodt52—it places 
restrictions on how farmers, in their capacity as end-users of soybean seed, can 
use the seed they have purchased. There would not seem to be a basis for 
favoring one of these analogies over the other as a matter of doctrine; again, 
farmers who agree to Monsanto’s Technology agreement are, at one and the 
same time, purchasers of patented articles (the seeds) and licensees in the 
manufacture of patented articles (plants grown from those seeds). This presents 
a problem: as end users, Supreme Court precedent might well immunize seed-
saving farmers from patent liability—though perhaps not contract liability53—
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938), aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 52.  See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703-09 (1992); cf. sources 
cited supra note 14. 
 53.  See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008) 
Winter 2013] SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 239 
while recent Federal Circuit doctrine would not.54 As licensees, however, even 
Supreme Court doctrine would hold seed-saving farmers liable for infringement 
for exceeding the limit of their licensed manufacturing rights.55 Again, self-
replicating technologies collapse the distinctions at the heart of current patent 
exhaustion doctrine. The user of such technologies is by definition also a maker 
of them; his purchase of a patented article is necessarily a license to 
manufacture more. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on patent exhaustion, in 
Quanta (and its predecessor, United States v. Univis Lens Co.56), do not appear 
to offer a way out of this dilemma. As noted above, at least some judges and 
scholars believe Quanta abrogated the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale 
doctrine.57 But there has been no suggestion that Quanta abrogates the older 
line of Supreme Court cases holding that a conditional license can operate to 
render a sale “unauthorized” and thus outside the scope of the first sale 
doctrine. And it is precisely the distinction between a “sale” and a “license” 
that self-replicating technologies confound. So even if we ignore the Federal 
Circuit’s conditional sale doctrine, we are still left with the question: are the 
farmers properly understood as purchasers (such that patent exhaustion applies) 
or licensed manufacturers (such that it doesn’t)? 
Perhaps other aspects of the Court’s opinions in Quanta and Univis Lens 
can offer some guidance on this question. Note that in each of those cases, the 
patentee authorized the sale of articles that were not literal embodiments of the 
patented inventions at issue, and yet those sales were held to trigger 
exhaustion.58 In Univis Lens, the Court reasoned that the sale of lens blanks 
“capable of use only in practicing” a patent for finished lenses triggered 
exhaustion.59 In Quanta, it reasoned that a semiconductor chipset “substantially 
embodies” a method patent for a computer system consisting of the chipset plus 
standard parts and common processes,60 and therefore triggers exhaustion upon 
its sale. Similarly, a seed could well be understood to “substantially embody” 
the plant that will grow from it, insofar as it requires only standard agricultural 
processes to produce that very plant. Moreover, a seed for such a plant is 
 
(noting the possible availability of contract remedies even where patent exhaustion applies). 
Of course other laws, such as antitrust law, might be invoked to hold the post-sale 
restrictions in Monsanto’s technology agreement unenforceable. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 
17, at 541 (discussing the divergence—or lack thereof—between first sale doctrine and 
antitrust scrutiny of contractual restrictions). 
 54.  See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. at 181-82; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 
703-09; cf. sources cited supra note 14. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
 57.  See Quanta, 533 U.S. at 617, 635-38; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 501 
& nn.60, 64; Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
585-86 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
 58.  Univis, 316 U.S. at 248-50; Quanta, 533 U.S. at 630-35. 
 59.  Univis, 316 U.S. at 249. 
 60.  Quanta, 533 U.S. at 633. 
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capable of use (as a seed) only in doing precisely that. If the Supreme Court’s 
language is read sufficiently broadly, it could be understood to require the 
conclusion that the sale of a seed exhausts a patent on the plant grown from that 
seed, just as the sale of a chipset exhausts a patent for a computer system 
incorporating the chipset or the sale of a lens blank exhausts a patent for a 
finished lens made from that blank. 
But something about the nature of self-replicating technologies seems to 
generate an intuitive resistance to this doctrinal analysis. That resistance, I 
think, rests on an important distinguishing feature of self-replicating 
technologies that is absent from the technologies at issue in Quanta and Univis 
Lens: the ability to generate multiple embodiments of the patented invention. 
Each chipset in Quanta could be used to make at most one computer system at 
any given time; the same could be said of the lens blanks in Univis Lens. But a 
single seed has the potential over time to generate a virtually unlimited number 
of additional seeds. This basic feature of self-replicating technologies, which 
the Federal Circuit warned could “eviscerate” patents on them, doesn’t really 
help us resolve the use/make dilemma or the license/sale dilemma. But it does 
suggest reasons for treating self-replicating technologies differently from other 
technologies with respect to patent exhaustion. While those reasons are not 
reflected in the distinctions drawn in extant doctrine, the discussion in the next 
two Parts will attempt to flesh them out. 
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 
The Federal Circuit held in the Roundup-Ready cases that a second-
generation soybean is a different “article” than the first generation seed from 
which it grew, asserting that any alternative result would “eviscerate” 
Monsanto’s patent. But this is a question-begging response to an unnecessarily 
formalist question, and there are other, better reasons why it might be 
undesirable to hold that a patentee’s sale of a single embodiment of its self-
replicating technology exhausts patent rights with respect to the second, third, 
or nth generation of the technology that is propagated from that first 
embodiment. Moreover, these other reasons are consistent not only with the 
rationale for granting patent rights in the first place, but with the pro-
competitive principles that justify limiting those rights through exhaustion 
doctrine. 
To get at these reasons, we must look beneath the Federal Circuit’s 
repeated assertion that applying patent exhaustion to subsequent generations of 
self-replicating technologies would “eviscerate” the patent for such 
technologies. While rhetorically powerful, the word “eviscerate” does little to 
illuminate the actual policy implications of the doctrinal choice presented in the 
Roundup-Ready cases. It does, however, imply a judgment that whatever 
policies patent protection serves would be undermined by applying patent 
exhaustion doctrine in this way. 
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A. Self-Replication and Self-Disclosure 
Ordinarily we think of patent protection as serving to spur innovation. The 
promise of supracompetitive returns under a time-limited patent monopoly is 
thought to provide the incentive to undertake costly investments in innovation 
that otherwise would not be made (due to the disincentive effects of free-riding 
by follow-on competitors who do not have to bear the fixed costs of the 
investments).61 But beneath this well-worn “incentive to invent” story is a nest 
of complications. First, many industries seem to be hotbeds of innovation 
notwithstanding their disqualification from or disuse of patent or any other 
form of intellectual property protection.62 Second, many patentable inventions 
may go unpatented because their creators do not think the cost of obtaining a 
patent is justified by the potential returns on the patent monopoly, or because 
they opt instead for other forms of protection, particularly trade secret 
protection. 
Professor Strandburg has developed a helpful framework for understanding 
this second group of complications. Strandburg distinguishes between “self-
disclosing inventions”—those that “are easily copied from their commercial 
embodiments”—and “non-self-disclosing” inventions, which are not.63 As she 
notes, “[t]he free-rider ‘incentive to invent’ theory does not apply to non-self-
disclosing inventions,” because the creator can commercialize the invention 
without running the risk of free-riding competitors copying it. For such 
inventions, the inventor will likely choose between patent protection and trade 
secret protection based on the relative cost of each approach (determined 
largely by the costs of prosecuting and defending a patent compared to the 
costs of maintaining secrecy) and the relative return to each approach 
(determined largely by the expected life of the patent compared to the expected 
length of time the secret can be maintained).64 For self-disclosing inventions, 
however, secrecy is not a viable option, and some other means of securing the 
inventor a return on investment (such as a patent monopoly) will be required to 
bring the invention to market.65 
 
 61.  See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962). 
 62.  See generally KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF 
ECONOMY (2012) (exploring the positive relationship between imitation and innovation in 
several industries that either cannot or do not access intellectual property protections). 
 63.  Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83. 
 64.  See id. at 110. Strandburg’s original framework does not account for the relative 
cost of obtaining a patent or maintaining secrecy, but others have noted that this comparison 
is highly relevant to inventors—particularly startups and other small firms—considering 
which form of legal protection to pursue. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues 
of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 331 (2008). 
 65.  Strandburg, supra note 63, at 109 (“For such self-disclosing inventions . . . the 
primary function of the patent system is to increase the period of market exclusivity enough 
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The distinction between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions 
offers a compelling policy argument in favor of the Federal Circuit’s decisions 
in the Roundup-Ready cases, and a useful tool for the analysis of self-
replicating technologies generally. Put simply: self-replication is an extreme 
form of self-disclosure. Self-replicating technologies don’t merely teach 
competitors how to practice a new invention, they supply such competitors with 
a factory as well. So for novel technologies that we believe have characteristics 
of public goods and therefore warrant a proprietary right to the inventor in the 
first place,66 self-replication poses an additional barrier to such appropriation. 
Granting an inventor a property right only in the first generation of a self-
replicating technology merely pushes the free-rider problem that patent 
protection purportedly solves down to subsequent generations. 
To see how this free-rider problem might play out, consider what 
incentives would be generated if the Federal Circuit had come out the other 
way in the Roundup-Ready cases—i.e., if patent exhaustion applied to the nth 
generation of a self-replicating technology not only for n = 1, but for n ≥ 1. We 
can refer to this as the “Exhaustion Scenario.” How would we expect a patentee 
to respond to such a legal regime? And what do we think would be the 
implications of that response both for innovation and for competition? 
We can begin to answer this question by noting the origins of exhaustion 
doctrine in what Professor Hovenkamp calls “the leverage theory,”67 the idea 
that in the absence of a first sale defense, patentees might use the leverage of 
the patent monopoly to extract a “double royalty” from downstream market 
actors.68 In the context of tying doctrines in antitrust law, this theory has drawn 
criticism from Chicago School economists and defense from other 
economists.69 And there are suggestions in the fight over Roundup-Ready 
technology that Monsanto’s licensing scheme amounts to the kind of “double-
dipping” royalty collection that leverage theory adherents abhor in the tying 
context.70 So perhaps the only effect of the Exhaustion Scenario will be that 
 
to provide a sufficient patent return to give an incentive to invent.”). 
 66.  See sources cited supra note 61. 
 67.  Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 511-14. 
 68.  Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863) (“Patentees . . . are entitled to but 
one royalty for a patented machine.”). Leverage theory continues to linger beneath the 
surface of exhaustion doctrine to this day; as Professor Hovenkamp notes, it was an element 
of the ultimately vindicated district court judgment in the Quanta case. Hovenkamp, supra 
note 17, at 512 & n.110, citing LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc. 2002 WL 
31996860, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (“The doctrine is designed to prevent a patentee 
from receiving a double royalty on a single patented invention.”). 
 69.  Compare Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (arguing that only a single monopoly profit can be earned even when 
bundling a product for which the seller has market power with a product for which it does 
not), with Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009) (arguing that the single monopoly profit theory 
only obtains under limited conditions that are not typical of all tying arrangements). 
 70.  McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1341 (“In McFarling’s words, ‘[b]y prohibiting seed-
saving, Monsanto has extended its patent on the gene technology to include an unpatented 
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inventors of self-replicating technologies will be limited (properly!) to a single 
royalty stream. 
The problem with this analysis is that the legal regime of the Exhaustion 
Scenario operates to foreclose the extraction of monopoly rents not only from 
downstream secondary market actors and separate markets, but also from later-
period players (including repeat players) in the primary market for the patented 
good itself. In the market for agricultural seeds, for example, the ability of seed 
purchasers to quickly manufacture competing seeds would make it difficult if 
not impossible for the inventor of a new seed technology to maintain a price 
above marginal cost for more than the time it takes to propagate one or two 
new generations. Generalizing, we could conclude that where certain 
conditions obtain—such as a significant share of demand coming from repeat 
or later-period purchasers, a relatively brief generational period compared to 
the patent term, and a cost of creating the technology that is greater than the 
premium that could reasonably be captured in a single generation’s first-period 
sales—we would expect the Exhaustion Scenario to dissipate inventors’ 
incentives to bring self-replicating technologies to market. In the Roundup-
Ready cases, for example, Monsanto might only be able recoup its investments 
in Roundup-Ready technology by selling its first generation of seeds to 
individual farmers for thousands (millions?) of dollars per bag, and at that price 
the market would be unlikely to clear (especially considering that any 
purchaser would face the same threat of follow-on competition). This is in 
essence the same dilemma Strandburg identifies for self-disclosing 
technologies.71 So one possible outcome of the Exhaustion Scenario is 
diminished innovation: a decrease in investments in new technologies, and a 
corresponding decrease in their production.72 
But there are alternatives to bringing a technology to market other than 
declining to invest in the technology’s development in the first place. An 
inventor might try to avoid the free-rider problem, not by declining to create a 
self-replicating technology, but by declining to sell it. Thus, a second possible 
outcome in the Exhaustion Scenario might resemble a trade secrecy regime 
combined with a program of vertical integration, particularly for technologies 
that can serve as a factor of production for other goods or services. In the 
Roundup-Ready example, Monsanto might decide that rather than selling 
soybean seeds, it should grow its own soybeans and then process them into the 
various downstream products for which soybeans are an input. This turns out to 
be a startling array of products, ranging from edible goods like vegetable oil 
and soy sauce, to agricultural supplies like livestock feed, to industrial products 
 
product—the germplasm—or God-made soybean seed which is not within the terms of the 
patent.’”). 
 71.  Strandburg, supra note 63, at 109. 
 72.  This conclusion is typical of earlier treatments of the subject of this Article. See, 
e.g., Jason Savich, Note: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on 
Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 127-29 (2007). 
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like adhesives, textiles, plastics and biofuels.73 And importantly, some of these 
products will disclose the genetic technology at the core of Monsanto’s patents 
to competitors and some will not, depending on the processing involved at 
various stages of the production chain. In the Exhaustion Scenario, we might 
therefore expect Monsanto to decline to allow its technology to be used to 
make end products that would disclose that technology, and to make other non-
disclosing products for which its technology is an input in-house under 
conditions of secrecy. We can find this state of affairs disagreeable on both 
innovation and competition policy grounds. 
With respect to innovation policy, the Exhaustion Scenario may result in 
diminished dissemination of technology compared to what we would expect 
under the legal regime developed by the Federal Circuit in the Roundup-Ready 
cases. This conclusion can be thought of in terms of the “make-or-buy” 
question typical of economic analysis of firm boundaries. As Professor Coase 
explains, we can think of the degree of vertical integration of a firm as a 
function of the comparative transaction costs involved in using the price 
mechanism as opposed to the hierarchical organization of the firm to direct 
factors of production.74 In the Exhaustion Scenario, however, the relevant 
question is not “make-or-buy,” but rather “make-or-sell.” The primary 
transaction cost at issue in this case, if we can call it that, is the risk of 
catastrophic free-riding. That cost may be greater or less depending on the 
extent to which the technology at issue is disclosed by the product being sold.75 
In general, we would expect the creator of a self-replicating technology to 
withhold it from the production chains for products that would disclose the 
technology to end users, while vertically integrating production chains for 
products that pose no danger of such disclosure.76 So returning to the Roundup-
Ready example, Monsanto might be willing to make and sell highly refined 
industrial products derived from soy, but not edible products in which genetic 
material might still be present, with the result that the latter markets would not 
benefit from access to Monsanto’s technology. Contrast this with the Federal 
 
 73.  Amer. Soybean Ass’n, SOYBEANS’ MANY EDIBLE USES, http://www.soystats.com/ 
2011/edibleuses.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013); Amer. Soybean Ass’n, SOYBEANS’ MANY 
INDUSTRIAL USES, http://www.soystats.com/2011/ industrialuses.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 
2013). 
 74.  See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in THE NATURE OF THE 
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter 
eds. 1991). 
 75.  Cf. Julia Porter Liebeskind, Knowledge, Stragtegy, and the Theory of the Firm, 17 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 93 (1996) (documenting advantages integrated firms enjoy over 
distributed markets in the protection of information from expropriation). 
 76.  Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Information, 9 J. LEG. 
STUD. 683, 715-18 (1980) (arguing that firms will vertically integrate to profit from valuable 
confidential information), citing Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (arguing that 
vertical integration offers a way for asset-owning firms to minimize the risk of opportunistic 
appropriation of rents by contracting counterparties). 
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Circuit’s regime, under which Monsanto may license its technology widely to 
soybean producers and allow those soybeans to be sold as a commodity for any 
downstream use without fear of free-riders competing away the rents flowing to 
its patent on the underlying genetic technology. This contrast demonstrates the 
extent to which the Exhaustion Scenario could curtail dissemination of a useful 
technology to areas of commerce that might benefit from it. 
Similarly, with respect to competition policy, the Exhaustion Scenario 
could encourage monopolization of downstream markets that might otherwise 
remain competitive, leading to higher prices and lower output than would be 
the case under the Federal Circuit’s approach. This is because the vertical 
integration strategy described above gives inventors of cost-saving self-
replicating technologies the opportunity to use those technologies to charge 
prices above the inventor’s marginal cost but below its rivals’ marginal cost in 
downstream markets, even if other firms would otherwise have competitive 
advantages in those markets. Thus, the Exhaustion Scenario could lead to a 
competitive landscape that may generate higher surplus for the inventor, but 
only at the cost of foregoing greater increases in consumer surplus under the 
Federal Circuit’s regime. Taking the Roundup-Ready cases again as an 
example, I argued above that in the Exhaustion Scenario Monsanto would have 
a strong incentive to vertically integrate into non-disclosing downstream 
markets while withholding its technology entirely from disclosing markets. In 
particular, it would likely bring in-house the production of end products that 
would not disclose its genetic technology—soy-fed livestock, or soy-based 
textiles, or industrial adhesives, for example—because otherwise it would have 
no way of profiting from the use of its technology as an input into those 
markets without running the risk of free-riding. Under the Federal Circuit’s 
approach, in contrast, Monsanto’s ability to protect itself against free-riders 
through patent law allows multiple producers in both disclosing and non-
disclosing downstream markets access to Roundup-Ready soybeans as an input. 
This allows for competition among such downstream producers with respect to 
competitive advantages other than access to Roundup-Ready soybeans, which 
we would expect to reduce prices and increase output in those downstream 
markets even further than the availability of Roundup-Ready technology alone. 
In sum, the trade secrecy regime implied by the Exhaustion Scenario is 
objectionable both on innovation and competition policy grounds. Perhaps for 
these reasons, the arguments of those who disagree with the Federal Circuit’s 
approach in the Roundup-Ready cases generally do not rest on such a trade 
secret approach. Instead, advocates propose that contract remedies—which are 
at least arguably not affected by patent exhaustion77—are sufficient to protect 
the interests of a patentee of self-replicating technologies. For example, Ms. 
Yee Wah Chin, one of the attorneys representing the interests of Monsanto’s 
farmer customers, argues that “Monsanto could have licensed seedmakers to 
sell seed embodying Monsanto technology on condition that the second-
 
 77.  See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
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generation seed be either consumed or sold to buyers who agree to either 
consume the seed or isolate that seed from other seed and sell the seed only for 
consumption.”78 More generally, patentees of self-replicating technologies 
might require all purchasers of embodiments of those technologies to agree to 
pay additional royalties on subsequent generations and/or to require their own 
customers either to take a similar license or to agree not to generate additional 
embodiments. 
There are several problems with this approach. First, it offers only contract 
remedies in the event of a breach, which differ meaningfully from patent 
remedies (particularly with respect to the availability of injunctive relief). 
Second and more importantly, the transaction costs generated by a contract 
approach are likely to be significantly higher than the approach adopted by the 
Federal Circuit in the Roundup-Ready cases. In a contract regime, every 
downstream player in every market for which soybeans are an input would 
have to take a license from Monsanto, generating additional transaction costs 
(especially bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement costs) at each layer of the 
market ecosystem. Moreover, at least some monitoring and enforcement costs 
would likely be shifted under a contract regime from the patentee to its 
licensees, who are likely to face significantly higher costs than the patentee 
(given the patentee’s expertise with its technology) and to introduce agency 
costs79 into the mix (given the relatively weak incentive of Monsanto’s 
licensees to prevent free-riding). Finally, in the event the technology somehow 
escapes this web of contracts, it is unlikely that Monsanto could be made 
whole. This is because it would have rights only against those parties with 
whom it is in privity of contract. Once the technology escapes the chain of 
privity, its ability to continually produce increasing numbers of embodiments in 
which Monsanto’s patent rights are exhausted would render those patents 
largely useless. Moreover, even if such an escape were the provable result of a 
licensee’s breach,80 a single licensee would be unlikely to have the resources to 
compensate Monsanto for such a catastrophic loss.81 Indeed, this risk alone 
(and a patentee’s recognition of it) is likely to cause the contract regime to 
collapse into the secrecy regime described above, with all its inherent 
 
 78.  Yee Wah Chin, Inexhaustible: Patents on Self-Replicating Technologies, 3 
LANDSLIDE (May/June 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1609794, at 5. 
 79.  For an overview of the theory of agency costs, see generally Kathleen M. 
Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 57 
(1989). 
 80.  It is entirely plausible that such an escape could occur without any breach of 
contractual obligations. See generally, e.g., Hilary Preston, Note, Drift of Patented 
Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability Theories, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2003) 
(discussing the challenge to patent doctrine of the problem of “drift” of genetic material from 
genetically modified crops to neighboring farms); Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The 
Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (2006) 
(undertaking an economic and legal analysis of the drift problem). 
 81.  Of course, there need not be a breach of license for a self-replicating technology to 
escape the chain of privity. 
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drawbacks. 
In sum, even though the Federal Circuit’s approach in the Roundup-Ready 
cases seems to limit the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine as applied to 
self-replicating technologies, and even though that doctrine is supposedly 
designed to foster competition and the dissemination of innovative 
technologies, the analysis above suggests that the alternative—what I have 
labeled the Exhaustion Scenario—actually fares worse in policy terms. In 
particular, the Exhaustion Scenario seems likely to generate higher transaction 
costs, decreased investments in innovation, decreased dissemination of 
innovation, and reduced competition in downstream markets. This may seem to 
be a counterintuitive result, and accordingly we can and should question some 
of the assumptions underlying the foregoing analysis. 
B. Qualifications and Objections 
One potential—and fundamental—objection to the foregoing analysis is 
that the patent incentive is unnecessary to secure production of self-replicating 
technologies, and thus the scope of patent rights in such technologies should be 
limited wherever possible.82 This is a species of the general critique of the 
“incentive to invent” thesis in intellectual property law.83 The types of self-
replicating technologies at issue in the Roundup-Ready cases are fairly new to 
the patent system, but they are not at all new to commerce. Unrestricted 
transfers, seed-saving, and follow-on improvements were the engine of 
innovation in new agricultural varieties for centuries, and no patent monopoly 
was needed to ensure a plentiful and steadily increasing variety of novel and 
improved agricultural products.84 Early interventions of the patent system into 
 
 82.  This argument, which sees a restrictive patent exhaustion doctrine as a kind of 
balancing mechanism against overbroad patent rights in the patent system at large, is similar 
to one made by Professor Merges in support of allowing patent misuse policy to be more 
muscular than antitrust tying policy so as to balance out other potentially anticompetitive 
advantages conferred on patentees. See generally Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current 
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 797 (1988) 
(“[P]roponents of a unified antitrust analysis overlook the fact that patent misuse serves as a 
valuable counterweight to equitable doctrines that favor the patentee.”). 
 83.  See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623 (2012) (claiming that external or pecuniary incentives are in general 
not needed to secure socially valuable innovations); see also supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (arguing that whatever incentives may be needed to spur 
innovation they do not entail the complete capture of social benefits by the innovator). 
 84.  See generally NOEL KINGSBURY, HYBRID: THE HISTORY AND SCIENCE OF PLANT 
BREEDING (2011). Kingsbury’s account suggests that the flourishing of new varieties and 
commercial-scale seed companies in the period from the late eighteenth century to the early 
twentieth century depended not on the availability of patent monopolies, but on the returns to 
a reputation for consistent production of high-quality innovations—more a trademark story 
than a patent story. See id. at 83-141. Of course, the poor understanding of genetics during 
that period combined with the difficulty of propagating desirable traits without such an 
understanding meant that many new varieties were not strictly self-replicating in the sense 
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the market for plant varieties also limited appropriability without any apparent 
cost to innovation. Breeders’ rights under the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA)85 
were limited to asexual reproduction (e.g., propagation by grafts and cuttings 
from the original patented plant itself),86 while the Plant Variety Protection Act 
of 197087 explicitly included a seed-saving right that is essentially equivalent to 
the position advocated by McFarling in his battle with Monsanto.88 In the 
interim between those regimes and the utility patent regime consolidated by 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,89 the “Green 
Revolution” that transformed world agriculture with huge gains in productivity 
through innovative breeding programs was accomplished largely on the 
strength of publicly and philanthropically funded institutions and researchers, 
not patent grants.90 In short, the historical evidence in favor of the “incentive to 
invent” theory for self-replicating technologies is not especially strong.91 
Assuming that we, nevertheless, remain committed to the patent system as 
a component of our innovation policy, it is still not at all clear that all 
 
under consideration here. See id. 
 85.  Plant Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 71-245, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930). 
 86.  Id. (excluding sexually reproduced plants and tubers from plant patent protection); 
see also Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that infringement under the successor to the PPA requires reproduction by grafting, 
cutting, and other physical divisions of the original patented plant, rather than by seed or by 
independent cultivation). 
 87.  Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”), Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970). 
 88.  Compare PVPA § 113, 84 Stat. at 1555, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2543 
(granting farmers a right to save seeds produced by patented plants), with McFarling I, 302 
F.3d at 1299 (arguing for extension of the PVPA’s seed-saving right to Monsanto’s 
genetically engineered seeds). 
 89.  534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001) (holding that neither the Plant Patent Act nor the Plant 
Variety Protection Act forecloses utility patent protection for plant varieties under the Patent 
Act, which does not include the farmer’s seed-saving privilege). 
 90.  See generally, e.g., Peter B.R. Hazell, Green Revolution, in THE OXFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC HISTORY (Joel Mokyr ed. 2003). See also Andrew Pollack, The 
Green Revolution Yields to the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/15/science/the-green-revolution-yields-to-the-bottom-
line.html (“The gene that spurred the green revolution in the 1960’s—creating high-yield 
grain and helping alleviate world hunger—was provided to Dr. Norman E. Borlaug by 
Washington State University. ‘If that happened today,’ he said, ‘Washington State would 
take out a patent and license it to DuPont or Monsanto or somebody.’”). 
 91.  One possible objection to this argument is that the type of genetic engineering 
technology at stake in the Roundup-Ready cases requires significantly more capital to 
produce than earlier forms of agricultural innovation, and thus requires the additional 
incentive of the patent monopoly in order to encourage the requisite capital formation. But 
this objection founders somewhat upon the immense public and philanthropic investments 
underlying the Green Revolution (see supra note 90), as well as the fact that much of 
Monsanto’s own technology was developed at a public research university. See Monsanto v. 
Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584, 587 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (describing contributions to Roundup-
Ready technology by a researcher at the University of British Columbia); Univ. of British 
Columbia, A Brief History of the University of British Columbia, U. BRIT. COLUM., 
http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/hist_ubc.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (charting the 
history of the University of British Columbia as a public institution). 
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industries, nor even all self-replicating technologies, will present the same set 
of incentives as hypothesized in the foregoing discussion.92 I have already 
suggested that the problem of downstream free-riding on self-replicating 
technologies might only obtain under certain specified conditions.93 More 
generally, the structure of demand and the nature of downstream uses of any 
particular self-replicating technology are likely to influence whether a shift of 
the free-rider problem into subsequent generations of that technology is likely. 
As an example, imagine a replication-capable virus used as a vector to 
deliver genetic therapies specifically designed to target a particular patient’s 
cancer.94 True, the technology’s usefulness may hinge on its ability to self-
replicate from a relatively small number of initial embodiments.95 But the 
additional embodiments created may not affect follow-on demand from the 
purchaser of the first embodiment—who, if treatment is successful (and, sadly, 
even if it is not), is likely to exit the market. Nor would those embodiments be 
likely to affect demand from other consumers whose cancers and immune 
systems might be sufficiently different to render another patient’s treatment 
useless or even harmful, even if subsequent-generation embodiments could be 
successfully, safely, and economically harvested from an earlier purchaser for 
reuse elsewhere. In short, nth-generation embodiments of self-replicating 
technologies used in medicine—particularly personalized medicine—may not 
significantly affect demand for first-generation embodiments, because the 
nature of those technologies may render nth-generation embodiments poor 
substitutes for first-generation embodiments. 
Contrast this hypothetical example with markets for commodities like 
soybeans, and it becomes apparent that not all patents for self-replicating 
technologies will necessarily be “eviscerated” should a purchaser of one 
embodiment use it without restriction to generate more. Importantly, this 
difference does not appear to map to the use/make distinction or the 
purchase/license distinction. Those distinctions thus appear unlikely to capture 
economically relevant variations in the structure of demand across current or 
potential future self-replicating technologies. Accordingly, some other doctrinal 
 
 92.  Cf. generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (advocating recognition of industry-specific differences in the 
appropriate scope of patent protection and identifying doctrinal policy levers for tailoring 
protection accordingly). 
 93.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See generally Mark A. Kay et al., Viral Vectors for Gene Therapy: The Art of 
Turning Infectious Agents into Vehicles of Therapeutics, 7 NATURE MED. 33 (2001) 
(presenting an overview of this developing area of biotechnology); Charlotte Dalba et al., 
Replication-Competent Vectors and Empty Virus-Like Particles: New Retroviral Vector 
Designs for Cancer Gene Therapy or Vaccines, 15 MOLECULAR THERAPY 457 (2007) 
(discussing the benefits and risks of replication-capable viral vectors). 
 95.  See Dalba et al., supra note 94, at 460-61 (noting that replication-defective vectors 
have failed in cancer gene therapy, but replication-capable vectors show promise for more 
efficient and thorough transduction to cancer tissues with minimal spread to non-targeted 
tissues). 
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tools for capturing these differences are warranted if we want patent exhaustion 
doctrine to reflect sound innovation and competition policy. 
IV. SUBSTITUTION AND THE COPYRIGHT ANALOGY: BALANCING INCENTIVES 
AND ACCESS 
I propose that a more fruitful approach to setting the scope of exhaustion 
doctrine may be found in the type of economic analysis typical of antitrust law. 
As Professors Lemley and McKenna have pointed out, something like antitrust 
market definition is already endemic to intellectual property law,96 and is a 
standard part of lost-profits damages analysis in patent law.97 They propose 
that such analysis may inform exhaustion doctrine as well, insofar as used 
goods are often the most likely substitutes for new goods covered by an 
intellectual property right.98 I would take their insights a step further, and argue 
that the concept of substitution—the cross-elasticity of demand at the heart of 
market definition in antitrust law99—is key to understanding the economic 
implications of exhaustion doctrine for self-replicating technologies, and 
perhaps for patent law in general. 
Specifically, we should recognize that the “evisceration” feared by the 
Federal Circuit appears to be evisceration of the monopoly power that allows a 
patentee to charge a supracompetitive price for a first-generation embodiment 
of its technology. It is the fear that, left unchecked, competition from nth-
generation embodiments sold by purchasers of first-generation embodiments 
will ultimately supplant demand for first-generation embodiments sold by (or 
under the authority of) the patentee. It is, in other words, a fear of substitution. 
After all, nth-generation embodiments of self-replicating technologies may well 
be perfect substitutes for first-generation embodiments. In terms of market 
definition analysis in antitrust law, we might conclude that the different 
generational cohorts of self-replicating technologies exhibit perfect cross-
elasticity of demand and that they unquestionably comprise a single 
undifferentiated market. Thus, the threat inherent in applying exhaustion 
doctrine to self-replicating technologies is that exhausted nth-generation 
embodiments will swiftly cannibalize the market for first-generation 
embodiments. 
This is a peculiar threat that is not present in other forms of competition 
that patentees might face. Lemley and McKenna rightly note when discussing 
exhaustion doctrine that used goods are often the most likely substitutes for 
 
 96.  Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? 
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012). 
 97.  Id. at 2070-71. 
 98.  Id. at 2115-17. 
 99.  As Professor Hovenkamp points out in his response to Lemley and McKenna’s 
article, concepts like substitution and cross-elasticity of demand may be better understood as 
(perhaps superior) alternatives to market definition rather than as proxies for it. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2141-42 (2012). 
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new goods,100 but they are typically not going to be perfect substitutes. For 
example, they may have suffered wear that makes them less functional, 
durable, or desirable than new goods; or they may require the outlay of 
additional costs (over and above the cost of a purchase authorized by the 
patentee) in order to bring them up to a level of quality sufficient to render 
them acceptable substitutes for new goods. Similarly, a patent confers a right to 
exclude others from accessing the precise technological solution to a problem 
that the patent claims, though it does not affect the right of others to devise 
other technological solutions to the same problem.101 As Professors Fromer 
and Lemley argue in forthcoming work, patent law’s implicit distinction 
between technical and market substitutes may spur salutary competition to 
generate alternative (and potentially superior) solutions to the commercial 
problem addressed by a patent,102 but again, perfect cross-elasticity of demand 
between such alternatives is unlikely. While both of these forms of 
competition—from used goods and from alternative solutions to a common 
problem—might divert some demand from a patented technology, neither 
seems to threaten the type of perfect substitution that would unravel the 
patentee’s monopoly in the patented technology itself. 
Perhaps this threat can best be thought of by analogy to a different area of 
intellectual property law: copyright. The danger to which the Federal Circuit 
seemed to respond in the Roundup-Ready cases is essentially identical to the 
danger that is thought to justify the reproduction right in copyright law—
another legal tool to prevent purchasers of an article from generating multiple 
identical articles.103 Consider Professor Landes’s and Judge Posner’s canonical 
economic analysis of the reproduction right: 
While the cost of creating a work subject to copyright protection . . . is often 
high, the cost of reproducing the work . . . is often low. And once copies are 
available to others, it is often inexpensive for these users to make additional 
copies. If the copies made by the creator of the work are priced at or close to 
marginal cost, others may be discouraged from making copies, but the 
creator’s total revenues may not be sufficient to cover the cost of creating the 
work. Copyright protection—the right of the copyright’s owner to prevent 
others from making copies—trades off the costs of limiting access to a work 
 
 100.  See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 98, at 2115-17. 
 101.  This feature of the patent system has spawned a long history of format wars, from 
the electric current war between Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse to the battle 
between Sony and Toshiba over standards for high-definition DVDs. Notably, these contests 
are fought and decided in the marketplace, not in courts or the Patent Office. 
 102.  Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, Audience and Substitution in IP 
Infringement (Oct. 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/sites/camlaw/files/fromer.pdf (“Subsequent inventors can develop 
a variety of market substitutes that are not also technological substitutes without running 
afoul of patent law. This market substitution benefits consumers and helps drive the progress 
of science and technology.”). 
 103.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive 
rights . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . .”); William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
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Landes and Posner may as well have been speaking here about the application 
of patent protection to self-replicating technologies. 
Of course, copyright law has its own exhaustion defense—and a statutory 
one at that.105 But notably, that defense modifies the copyright owner’s 
distribution right, but not his reproduction right.106 If we were to apply an 
analogous principle in the Roundup-Ready cases, we might allow a farmer to 
resell (i.e., distribute) the seeds he purchases, but not to use them to make 
additional seeds (i.e., reproductions), at least as a matter of intellectual property 
law. This conclusion resonates strongly with the use/make distinction in patent 
law’s exhaustion doctrine, but again founders on the inseparability of use and 
replication. Unlike a copy of a copyrighted work, an embodiment of a self-
replicating technology cannot be used by its first purchaser prior to resale 
without creating a new embodiment. So a mechanical extension of the 
distribution/reproduction distinction of copyright law to patent exhaustion 
doctrine ends up giving the purchaser of an embodiment of a self-replicating 
technology significantly narrower rights than the purchaser of a copy of a 
copyrighted work. We might therefore eschew formal analogies and take a 
closer look at the policy justifications for copyright’s exhaustion doctrine—and 
particularly the role in those policies of substitution—to inform our analysis of 
patent exhaustion as applied to self-replicating technologies and more 
generally. 
One of these justifications in particular is informative. As Professor Reese 
explains, one argument in favor of copyright’s exhaustion doctrine is that it 
mitigates some of the more unfortunate results of intellectual property law’s 
policy of using monopoly rights to incentivize innovation.107 In particular, an 
exhaustion defense to infringement liability allows for at least some expansion 
of access to a copyrighted work beyond the pool of consumers willing and able 
to pay the copyright owner’s monopoly price, without unduly threatening the 
copyright owner’s ability to charge that monopoly price in the first place.108 It 
is, in essence, a policy lever to balance the incentives to innovation that 
intellectual property rights provide against the access to knowledge that they—
at least temporarily—restrict. This view of exhaustion doctrine’s role is 
consistent with the argument raised above that intellectual property rights ought 
in principle to be limited where possible,109 and with the classic Jeffersonian 
characterization of intellectual property monopolies as “embarrassment[s]” to 
 
 104.  Landes & Posner, supra note 103, at 326. 
 105.  17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 106.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (qualifying the distribution right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), 
but not the reproduction right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)). 
 107.  See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 
B.C.L. REV. 577, 583-92 (2003). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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be grudgingly tolerated rather than fundamental rights to be zealously 
reinforced.110 
This understanding of the role and the stakes of exhaustion doctrine—and 
particularly the role of substitution in determining its scope—offers far more 
useful tools for distinguishing among the cases and hypothetical cases 
discussed in this Article than the various doctrinal distinctions on which they 
currently rest. For example, take the discussion of Quanta and Univis Lens 
above, where it was noted that language of those cases might be read to give 
the farmers in the Roundup-Ready cases a defense.111 The intuition against this 
result, as I noted, may be rooted in the recognition that a single exhausted 
embodiment (or substantial embodiment) is somehow meaningfully different 
from a potentially unlimited number of exhausted nth-generation 
embodiments,112 but we can now go further and explain why that distinction 
ought to be deemed relevant. Put simply, it is because extending the exhaustion 
doctrine to cover such nth-generation embodiments would scotch the balance 
between incentives and access. True, it would expand access to the patented 
technology greatly, but only by flooding the market with perfect substitutes that 
make it impossible for the patentee to maintain a supracompetitive price for 
first-generation embodiments. It is this inability to charge a supracompetitive 
price that threatens to negate whatever incentive to innovation patent law 
affords, and thereby creates the incentive to resort to the alternative 
unsatisfactory regimes analyzed in Part III. 
This same framework of balancing incentives against access can similarly 
help us to explain the distinction between Roundup-Ready seeds and the 
engineered viral vector described at the conclusion of Part III.113 Here, it is not 
the number of nth-generation embodiments that matters, but the extent to which 
any nth-generation embodiment is a good substitute for a first-generation 
embodiment. Because the nth-generation viruses are likely only useful to the 
person who purchased the first-generation virus that produced them, and 
because such a person is unlikely to be able to obtain a suitable nth-generation 
virus without first obtaining a first-generation virus, it is unlikely that holding 
nth-generation viruses exhausted would have any effect on the patentee’s 
ability to charge a supracompetitive price for first-generation viruses, thus 
obviating the need to resort to legal regimes other than patent law. Conversely, 
holding such nth-generation viruses exhausted would be unlikely to 
significantly expand access, while failing to so hold might give a patentee 
 
 110.  THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 
1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334–35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 
1903). For a skeptical view of the historical and jurisprudential relevance of Jefferson’s oft-
cited characterization, see generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007). 
 111.  See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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significant power to restrict access in potentially harmful ways.114 
The foregoing discussion not only demonstrates the power of the functional 
analysis developed in this Article in distinguishing among good and bad 
exhaustion claims, but it illustrates the inability of the formalist analysis in 
extant precedent to do so. Comparison of Quanta and Univis Lens on the one 
hand with the Roundup-Ready cases on the other suggests that the fact that a 
defendant is “using” an embodiment is not a sufficient condition for the 
exhaustion defense to apply. Conversely, comparison of the Roundup-Ready 
cases and the hypothetical viral vector example suggests that the fact a 
defendant is “making” an embodiment is not sufficient to demonstrate that the 
exhaustion defense should fail. The latter comparison similarly demonstrates 
that self-replication need not be in itself a bar to an exhaustion defense. In 
short, neither the use/make distinction nor the ability of a technology to self-
replicate are sufficient factual predicates for determining the applicability of the 
exhaustion doctrine. In all instances, some recourse to the concept of 
substitution—and underlying it a meaningful analysis of the nature of the 
technology at issue and the structure of demand for it—is necessary to draw the 
relevant distinctions. Ultimately, some judgment about the appropriate balance 
of access and incentives must be brought to bear as part of that analysis. 
We see these principles at work in the Supreme Court’s earlier repair and 
reconstruction cases: American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons115 and Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Co.116 In Simmons, the disposable 
nature of the cotton bale ties at issue likely rendered a suitably refurbished tie a 
very good substitute for a new one, and it seems likely that a single 
embodiment might profitably be refurbished for reuse more than once.117 This 
combination of facts might well lead a court to conclude that allowing 
downstream players to refurbish the patentee’s products could seriously affect 
the patentee’s ability to charge a supracompetitive price for new 
embodiments.118 In Aro Manufacturing, in contrast, the issue was whether a 
secondary market seller could supply an unlicensed replacement part for a 
component of the patentee’s product (the fabric of a convertible car top) that 
was susceptible to much more rapid wearing out than the rest of the product.119 
Allowing such downstream activity might well lengthen the period of repeat 
 
 114.  For example, if suitable means of measurement are available, the patentee might 
use replication as a basis to meter its pricing, potentially allowing it to capture more surplus 
but also potentially pricing out those with the greatest need for the technology. This might be 
a particularly salient concern for medical technologies. 
 115.  106 U.S. 89 (1882). 
 116.  365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
 117.  Simmons, 106 U.S. at 91-93 (noting that the defendant purchased severed 
fragments of used bale-ties in bulk and riveted them back together). 
 118.  Id. at 92 (noting that the patentee sold its bale-ties new at 6 cents per pound while 
the defendant purchased used and severed ties as scrap at 1.25 cents per pound). 
 119.  Aro Mfg., 365 U.S. at 337-38 (“The components of the patented combination, 
other than the fabric, normally are usable for the lifetime of the car, but the fabric has a much 
shorter life.”). 
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demand for new embodiments, but probably not to the extent that the patentee 
would be unable to charge a supracompetitive price for new embodiments 
(particularly where its products were mainly purchased by automobile 
manufacturers for factory installation in new cars).120 Of course, these are both 
issues of degree—in either case the patentee might respond to the alleged 
infringer’s conduct by raising its price to capture whatever surplus it might lose 
to secondary market activity, which could reduce demand in the primary 
market but could also generate complex price discrimination dynamics. The 
question then becomes one of judgment: whether such a price increase would 
end up narrowing demand for new embodiments to such an extent as to 
undermine the incentive to innovate (or, conversely, that insufficient new 
embodiments would be created to supply the secondary market, undermining 
the policy of expanding access to technology). 
This question of judgment may also help shed light on the distinction that 
has recently divided the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in their patent 
exhaustion jurisprudence: the distinction between a conditional license and a 
conditional sale.121 While a full exploration of that distinction is beyond the 
scope of this brief Article, it seems to raise the same questions as have been 
discussed here. Again, these questions address the substitutability of a used 
secondary market good for a primary market good, the effects of such 
substitution on the ability of a patentee to charge supracompetitive prices in the 
primary market, and the balance between the incentives that those 
supracompetitive prices provide and the access to technology that they curtail. 
Attempting to characterize a particular transaction as either a license or a sale is 
not likely to be especially helpful in ascertaining these types of market 
dynamics. It would probably be more useful to consider the effect of enforcing 
the post-transaction restrictions the patentee seeks to impose on access to the 
patentee’s technology, and conversely the effect of refusing to enforce those 
restrictions on its ability to charge a supracompetitive price sufficient to recoup 
its investment by some other means within the patent system. Such questions 
are likely to be significantly more complex than the analysis in this Article, 
particularly in light of the broad array of alternative transactional arrangements 
by which a given technology might be commercialized and the varying degrees 
of market interventions a court might have to consider in deciding whether a 
particular transactional arrangement strikes an appropriate balance between 
incentives and access.122 But ultimately, this appears to be the fundamental 
 
 120.  Id. at 337 (“Tops embodying the patent have been installed by several automobile 
manufacturers in various models of convertibles.”). 
 121.  See sources cited supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
 122.  For example, in a case like Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992), we might be uncomfortable with a court deciding that the patentee ought to 
charge more for new devices—squeezing some customers out of the primary market—for 
the purpose of encouraging development of a secondary market. The incentives facing a 
monopolistic seller in such a circumstance are actually quite complex, even under the 
simplifying assumption that secondary market goods are not differentiated from primary 
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question implicated by judicial decisions on the scope of exhaustion doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Given how little we can presume to know about the future development of 
self-replicating technologies, it is likely unwise to try to set a bright-line rule 
today to govern the rights of downstream users for all such technologies that 
may arise tomorrow. Fortunately, the Supreme Court appears to be highly 
attuned (perhaps to a fault) to this danger.123 What would be welcome as the 
Supreme Court considers the Bowman case is an attention to function over 
form, and a due regard for the effects of a rule on innovation, competition, and 
access to technology throughout and across markets, rather than an effort to 
justify selection of one out of two equally plausible characterizations of a 
particular transaction. So long as we continually ask ourselves what incentives 
will be created by holding a patent exhausted in a particular set of 
circumstances, and how those incentives will affect the scope of competition 
and innovation going forward, the self-replicating technologies of the future 
need not throw the doctrine of patent exhaustion into disarray. To the contrary, 
they may be uniquely suited to clarifying the economic issues at the root of 
exhaustion doctrine, as this Article has argued. In particular, self-replicating 
technologies may present unique problems of secondary-market substitution, 
undermining the ability of a patentee to charge supracompetitive prices in its 
primary market and thereby leading innovators to seek out non-patent means of 
appropriating the value of their innovations. But while many self-replicating 
technologies can present such problems, it is by no means certain that all self-
replicating technologies will do so, and this Article’s exploration of what 
makes self-replication such a threat to a patentee has illuminated the 
fundamental economic issues implicated by the scope of the exhaustion 
defense. Rather than attempting to set the boundaries of exhaustion doctrine by 
reference to unstable formal categories (be they self-replicating/non-self-
replicating, use/make, or license/sale), courts would better serve the innovation 
and competition policies underlying the doctrine by frankly assessing the 
application of those policies to the nuanced factual settings of individual cases. 
 
 
market goods. See generally Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, Monopoly with Resale, 
37 RAND J. ECON. 362 (2006) (modeling interactions between monopolist sellers in a 
primary market and buyers in primary and secondary markets). 
 123.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227-28 (2010). 
